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VIRGINIA LAW OF INTEREST AND USURY
John W. Edmonds, 111*
INTRODUCTION
The concept of a limitation upon the charges that may be im-
posed for the hire of money is hardly modem. Although it may not
be the oldest usury law, a reference to Deuteronomy should suffice:
Unto a stranger thou mayest lend upon usury; but unto thy brother
thou shall not lend upon usury.'
This has been termed the earliest "corporate" exception to the
usury laws. Gentiles passing through Israel were tradesmen and
hiring of money to tradesmen was not against the law of Moses.
"Brethren" were fellow Hebrews, akin to our present class of "con-
sumers" or neighbors in need. One can reflect that the present stat-
ute2 forbidding a plea of usury upon business and investment loans
of an initial $5,000.00 or more is nothing new since the law of Moses.
In 1730, Virginia passed its first interest and usury law legalizing
a 6% rate.3 Interest was fixed at $6.00 per $100.00 in 1819 and a
* Partner, Maya, Valentine, Davenport and Moore, Richmond, Virginia; B.A. University
of Richmond, 1953; LL.B., 1956. The author was Chairman of the Committee to the Code
Commission which recodified and rearranged the statutes relating to money and interest
pursuant to S. J. Res. 41, Virginia General Assembly, Regular Session (1974).
1. Deuteronomy 23:20 (King James). Usury is defined as "interest exceeding the lawful
rate for the loan or forbearance of money." 19 Micmn's JURISFRUiDNC, Usury § 2, at 251.
2. VA. ConE ANN. § 6.1-330.44 (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides:
No person shall, by way of defense or otherwise, avail himself of the provisions of
this chapter, or any other section relating to usury to avoid or defeat the payment of
interest, or any other sum, when such loan is made to an individual or individuals or
other entity for.the acquisition or conduct of a business or investment as sole proprie-
tor, owner, joint venturers or owners provided the initial amount of the loan is five
thousand dollars or more.
For the purposes of this section, if a borrower shall represent in his own handwriting
the purposes of the loan, such representation shall be conclusive and binding upon
him.
For the purposes of this section, unless a loan is for family, household, or personal
purposes (which shall not include a passive or active investment), it shall be deemed
to be for business or investment purposes within the meaning of this section.
3. 4 Hennings Stat. 194. This rate was reduced to 5% in 1734, but restored to 6% per annum
in 1796.
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higher charge rendered the obligation, both principal and interest,
utterly void.' Virginia had a legal, contract and judgment rate of 6%
in 1819.5 In 1873, the contract rate was raised to 8% and banks were
permitted to discount or collect interest in advance at the rate of
2/3 of 1% for thirty days, or 8% annually;' a more significant change,
however, was to provide that the penalty for usury nullified the
excess interest only.7
Two other statutory enactments affected interest rates in Virginia
during this period. First, Congress in 1864 passed the National Bank
Act, referring to the state law of the location of the national bank
for permissible interest charges.' Second, Virginia in 1873 adopted
legislation denying to corporations the plea of usury At that time,
corporations were created by special act of the legislature; Virginia,
like other states, was without a general business corporation act.
Although some background material on the corporate usury statute
appears in the case law,10 there is little discussion of the rationale
for its enactment. Presumably such statutes rest upon the fact that
corporations are sophisticated creatures with limited liability.
4. Code of 1819, ch. 102, at 373-74. There was also a limitation on broker's fees of $.25 per
$100.00, with a lesser $0.17 per $100.00 permitted on renewals.
5. The meanings of the different rates are discussed in text accompanying-notes 52-54 infra.
6. Code of 1873, ch. 137, § 4, at 977.
7. Id. § 5.
8. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 30, 13 Stat. 108, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1945). See
note 16 infra.
An early interpretation of 12 U.S.C. § 85 in Tiffany v. National Bank, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
409 (1873), spelled out the fact that national banks were not necessarily limited by state law,
but might avail themselves of the rate permitted by the state to any lender, even though state
banks expressly did not have this privilege. Evans v. National Bank, 251 U.S. 108 (1919),
pointed out that national banks might discount or collect interest in advance even though
such discount is expressly denied to state banks by state law.
Judicial construction of 12 U.S.C. § 85 has been consistently liberal. See, e.g., Northway
Lanes v. Hackley Union Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 464 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1972) (national
bank can charge closing costs prohibited to state banks but permitted to savings and loan
associations); Commissioner of Small Loans v. First Nat'l Bank, 268 Md. 305, 300 A.2d 685
(1973) (national banks can charge interest on small loans at same rate as small loan compa.
nies are permitted to charge on comparable loans even though state banks are limited to a
lesser rate); cf. Partain v. First Nat'l Bank, 467 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1972) (national banks, in
connection with a credit card operation can charge small loan rates, but cannot charge
interest on interest where this was expressly denied to small loan companies.)
9. Va. Acts of Assembly 1873, ch. 213, at 194, codified at Code of 1873, ch. 57, § 36, at
544.
10. See Town of Danville v. Pace, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 1 (1874), where it was held that the
statute was retroactive in effect and not unconstitutional.
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In general, the interest laws of Virginia remained untouched until
the 1960's, with three exceptions, all relating to consumer credit and
smaller loans. Virginia in 1918 adopted a Small Loan Law permit-
ting loans up to $300, at a rate of 31/2% per month on the unpaid
principal balance." One can speculate that the monthly rate was
used to avoid infringing what had come to be the sacrosanct 6% per
annum. While the maximum rate declined, the maximum loan
amount increased so that in 1973 the statutory rates were 21/2% per
month on the first $300.00 and 12% per month on the next
$700.00.12 In 1974, such rates and maximum loans were referred to
the State Corporation Commission and an initial maximum loan
amount was fixed at $1,500.00.13 In the 1974-75 recodification the
provisions relating to loans by small loan companies were left in a
separate statute and no attempt was made to combine them in the
new Chapter 7.2 of Title 6.1.
In 1928, Virginia enacted its first add-on interest rate, giving in-
dustrial loan associations the right to charge 6% add-on, plus an
initial 2% service charge. 14 The industrial loan associations lent
money to individuals who agreed to pay it back in regular install-
ments. At the time of the legislation, self-amortizing monthly pay-
ment real estate loans were not routine devices for financing resi-
dential real estate transactions. The add-on interest rate preserved
what might be referred to as the 6% myth. A nominal rate of 6% on
the initial balance was retained, without giving credit against the
6% interest rate for principal payments, thereby providing an actual
yield of somewhat less than twice the nominal yield. The add-on
privilege was granted to banks in 1938.15
In 1933, another gloss was added to the interest rates permitted
11. Va. Acts of Assembly 1918, ch. 402, § 14, at 666. The rate was lowered to 2% in 1942.
Va. Acts of Assembly 1942, ch. 107, at 126. It was raised to 2V2% in 1944. Va. Acts of Assembly
1944, ch. 370, § 4168-a 37, at 562.
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-272 (Rep. Vol. 1973), repealed by Va. Acts of Assembly 1974, ch.
371, at 640.
13. Va. Acts of Assembly 1974, ch. 371, at 640, codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-271, -271.1
(Cum. Supp. 1975).
14. Va. Acts of Assembly 1928, ch. 448, § 6, at 1143. Industrial loan associations were
originally authorized in 1920. Va. Acts of Assembly 1920, ch. 74, at 61.
15. The add-on privilege for banks was incorporated into the section permitting the dis-
count or collection of interest in advance. Va. Acts of Assembly 1938, ch. 72, at 126. The
section appears in the recodification at VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.13 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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national banks."8 It was argued that the member bank privilege of
borrowing from Federal Reserve banks had little chance of acting as
a safety valve in times of tight money, unless the banks were guar-
anteed a profit or at least assured of no loss on the money borrowed
for relending purposes. The Carter Glass Amendment, 7 named after
the Virginia Senator who acted as its sponsor, gave to national
banks only (and not to state member banks of the Federal Reserve
System) the right to charge 1% more than the 90-day discount rate
at the regional Federal Reserve bank.18
The General Assembly in 1960 recognized the existence of a na-
tional interest market and permitted lenders principally in the
business of making real estate loans for resale to impose an initial
1% service, processing or investigation fee.'9 The legislature was not
enacting a new charge on mortgage loans, but merely recognizing an
16. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1945) governs the interest rates permitted national banks and provides
in part:
Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount made,
or upon any notes, bills of exchange, or other evidences of debt, interest at the rate
allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or District where the bank is located, or at
a rate of 1 per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper
in effect at the Federal reserve bank in the Federal reserve district where the bank is
located, whichever may be the greater, and no more, except that where by the laws of
any State a different rate is limited for banks organized under State laws, the rate so
limited shall be allowed for associations organized or existing in any such State under
this chapter. When no rate is fixed by the laws of the State, or Territory, or District,
the bank may take, receive, reserve, or charge a rate not exceeding 7 per centum or 1
per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at
the Federal reserve bank in the Federal reserve district where the bank is located,
whichever may be the greater, and such interest may be taken in advance, reckoning
the days for which the note, bill, or other evidence of debt has to run.
17. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, § 25, 48 Stat. 191.
18. It should be noted that the right of the national bank to impose such a rate does not
depend upon the fact of borrowing by the particular national bank from its Federal Reserve
bank.
19. Va. Acts of Assembly 1960, ch. 438, at 691, codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 6-348.3 (Cum.
Supp. 1964), recodified at id. § 6.1-323 (Repl. Vol. 1966). Savings and loan associations were
also given the right to collect the 1% initial service charge, as well as a 21/2% fee on construc-
tion loans. Va. Acts of Assembly 1966, ch. 584, at 821-22, codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-
195.17 (Repl. Vol. 1973). Both acts were repealed by Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 448, at
769 but § 6.1-195.17 was recodified at VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.24 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
In 1964, banks and other lenders were given the right to charge the 1% initial fee on
mortgage loans and 21/2% on construction loans. Va. Acts of Assembly 1966, ch. 584, at 855,
codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-324 (Repl. Vol. 1973), recodified at id. § 6.1-330.23 (Cum.
Supp. 1975).
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existing charge which could have become questionable with the rise
in interest rates on long term mortgages. Mortgage bankers were
closing loans in their own names for the purpose of reselling them
as a package to out-of-state investors. The brokers had long imposed
this 1% initial charge. Until long term mortgage rates went over 5%
per annum, there could have been no question as to the legality of
such a 1% charge.
The plea of usury on FHA and VA loans was eliminated in 1960,20
in recognition of the fact that there was federal regulation of these
rates and that Virginia FHA and VA mortgages competed in a
national, not a state or local, market. Also in 1960, banks were per-
mitted to charge 1% per month on plans for revolving credit.2 1
The impetus for this change was twofold. A new concept in credit,
check credit or overdraft banking had reached its time. Under more
advanced bookkeeping, bank customers having a pre-arranged line
of credit could write checks which would otherwise create overdrafts
and the bank would make automatic loans by transferring multiples
of $100.00 or other pre-arranged amounts to cover such checks. 22
There was concern in 1966 about alleged gouging on second mort-
gage loans, which, except for industrial loan associations and banks,
were limited to 6% simple interest. The legislative solution was to
permit all lenders, not otherwise supervised and licensed by the
State Corporation Commission or the federal government, to charge
6% add-on interest. All loans by such lenders at charges in excess
of such rates were void as to both principal and interest.2 This
solution invited into the second mortgage market other legitimate
lenders attracted by the more economically realistic rates, while
making the penalty for violation harsher and a greater deterrent.
In 1968, interest rates had started their upward climb and the 6%
20. Va. Acts of Assembly 1960, ch. 65, at 68, codified at VA. ConE ANN. § 6.1-328 (Repl.
Vol. 1973), recodified at id. § 6.1-330.38 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
21. Va. Acts of Assembly 1960, ch. 74, at 97, codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 6-348, recodified
at id. § 6.1-330.19 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
22. The Comptroller of the Currency has indicated that national banks might do this by
reference to 12 U.S.C. § 85 and the rate allowed other lenders under the doctrine of Tiffany
v. National Bank, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409 (1873). CoMPoRoLLER's MANUAL FOR NATIONAL BANKS,
7.7310 (Jan. 1974).
23. Va. Acts of Assembly 1966, ch. 285, at 460, codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.3 (Repl.
Vol. 1973), recodified at id. § 6.1-330.25 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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general limitation on interest tended to keep needed mortgage and
other investment money out of Virginia. A special commission was
created to study the interest laws and it recommended a 12% con-
tract interest rate which would permit rates to be fixed at a competi-
tive level while prohibiting excessive gouging.24 The argument
against a less significant increase in the interest rate was that it
would merely suggest an automatic increase to the maximum con-
tract rate.25 Again the economy moved faster than the legislature
and Virginia found in 1970-a severe drought in mortgage money.
Theorizing that there was a supply and demand economy in first
mortgages, the General Assembly adopted a policy that a first mort-
gage could be enforced at the rate stated in the mortgage, without
regard to normal usury limitations."
Due to computer capacity in the late 60's, the credit card was
beginning to take hold. At least one system had operated in Virginia
utilizing the 1% per month charge permitted on revolving credit.2
Many merchants, operating under the time-price doctrine, were
charging a monthly rate of 11 /% on merchandise credit allowing the
normal thirty days from billing for payment. New legislation
conferred upon all lenders the right to charge 11 % per month on
this type of credit if it was not paid within twenty-five days from
the billing date. The justification for the 25-day free period lay in
the fact that most money lenders or sellers bill from the same nu-
merical date each month. 9
24. H. DEL. Doc. No. 14, 1968 General Assembly, at 9.
25. The contract rate was raised to 8% by Va. Acts of Assembly 1968, ch. 92, at 142, codified
at VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-319 (Repl. Vol. 1973), recodified at id. § 6.1-330.11 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
The statute was unique in that it required amounts paid by persons other than the borrower,
e.g. bonus points paid by the seller, to be included for rate computation purposes.
26. Va. Acts of Assembly 1970, ch. 38, at 31-32, codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-319.1,
recodified in parts at id. §§ 6.1-330.27, -330.37, -330.40 (Cum. Supp. 1975). The legislature
provided that the statute would apply only to transactions closed within two years or prior
to July 1, 1972. The author is happy to report that the evidence showed Virginia lenders
following or staying slightly under national averages and the two year limitation was dropped
in 1972.
27. See VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-320 (Repl. Vol. 1973), recodified at id. § 6.1-330.19 (Cum.
Supp. 1975).
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-362 (Repl. Vol. 1973), recodified at id. § 6.1-330.20 (Cum. Supp.
1975).
29. The specification of a 25-day free period as opposed to a 30-day free period generally
keeps such credit card operators from having to take the blame for delay in the mails. Also
28 days in February would create an annual problem.
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In 1970 partnerships were added to the persons limited in
invoking the plea of usury. 0 This action presented problems as well
as solutions. To protect against lenders requiring sham lartnerships
for borrowing purposes, the exception was made applicable'to those
partnerships which had filed under the partnership certificate stat-
ute.3' To obtain money at the current market price, many business
enterprises were being forced to incorporate where a partnership
entity would have been preferable for tax and other purposes. The
subsidiary question of whether limited partnerships had to file a
partnership certificate as well as a limited partnership certificate"
was presented, and cured by a 1972 amendment which provided
that limited partnership certification was sufficient." Certain real
estate joint ventures were also included among the entities which
could not invoke the usury laws. 4 Foreign partnerships were covered
by recent legislation" providing that no foreign partnership can
plead usury, without regard to its filing of a Virginia certificate.
Another 1972 amendment denied the plea of usury on a second
mortgage where it secured a loan to an individual for business pur-
poses and the loan was for $5,000.00 or more. In 1972, the Virginia
Supreme Court pointed out that the Second Mortgage Act was sepa-
rate from the other usury laws and that the limitation on the plea
of usury applied only to loans under Chapter 7 and not to loans
under Chapter 7.1, the Second Mortgage Act.37 Three 1973 amend-
ments were designed to modify this result.
30. Va. Acts of Assembly 1970, ch. 234, at 310, codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-327 (Repl.
Vol. 1973), recodified at id. § 6.1-330.43 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
31. VA. CODE AN. § 50-74 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-45 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
33. Va. Acts of Assembly 1972, chs. 636, 677, at 840, 904, codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-
327 (Repl. Vol. 1973), recodified at id. § 6.1-330.43 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
34. Id.
35. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 448, at 778, codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.43
(Cum. Supp. 1975).
36. Va. Acts of Assembly 1972, ch. 517, at 592, codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-327.1 (Repl.
Vol. 1973), recodified at id. § 6.1-330.44 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
37. Tuttle v. Haddock, 213 Va. 63, 189 S.E.2d 363 (1972). The case involved a loan to a
corporation secured by a second deed of trust on certain property. Upon bankruptcy, the
trustee for the guarantor contended the note was usurious. The noteholders pointed to VA.
CODE ANN. § 6.1-327 (Repl. Vol. 1973) denying the plea of usury to corporations. The court,
however, noted that the statute applied only to loans under Chapter 7 and that section 6.1-
330.1 of Chapter 7.1 was applicable, rendering the note usurious.
38. Va. Acts of Assembly 1973, ch. 318, at 433, codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-327,
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Interest and usury seems to be an annual topic for the legislature,
after remaining dormant (or nearly so) for about 100 years. The 1974
session was no exception. Banks and savings and loan associations
were extended the 7% add-on privilege and the $1,000.00 limitation
on the 2% service charge in the case of banks was omitted.39 Savings
and loan associations and other lenders were permitted to charge 3%
more than the rate being paid on savings and time deposits on loans
secured by such savings."0
In 1974, the Virginia General Assembly restored the rule of Deu-
teronomy 41 prohibiting the plea of usury on loans for business or
investment purposes in an initial amount of $5,000.00 or more. 4 The
statute permits a lender to inquire of a borrower the purpose of a
loan and the handwritten representation of the borrower is conclu-
sive. The statutory language was suggested by the holding in
Heubusch v. Boone,13 in which a lawyer was estopped from charac-
terizing a loan as illegal and usurious when he had endorsed it and
given a written opinion as to its validity at time of closing.
Imitation may be the sincerest form of flattery, and in 1974, Con-
gress passed legislation relating to insured banks and permitting a
charge of 5% above the Federal Reserve discount rate on business
loans of $25,000.00 or more. 4 The federal statute, in addition to
having a higher threshold amount, does not contain statutory lan-
guage permitting the borrower to represent in writing the purpose
of the loan or a definition of business purpose as provided by the
Virginia statute. It also does not contain the qualifying word "ini-
tial" before the amount of the loan, thereby leaving uncertain the
effect of a payment reducing the principal amount of the loan below
the statutory amount. The Virginia statute permits and encourages
such prepayments, while the federal statute leaves a problem as to
the applicable rate on such loan as it is paid down. Comparison of
the federal statute and the Virginia statute leaves one with an ap-
preciation of Moses both as a law giver and an economist.
-327.1, -330.1, recodified at id. §§ 6.1-330.43, -330.44 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
39. Va. Acts of Assembly 1974, chs. 284, 290, at 429, 440.
40. Id., chs. 261, 284, at 387, 428.
41. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
42. Va. Acts of Assembly 1974, ch. 393, at 679, codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-319.2 (Cum.
Supp. 1974), recodified at id. § 6.1-330.44 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
43. 213 Va. 414, 192 S.E.2d 783 (1971).
44. Act of October 29, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-501, § 201, 88 Stat. 1557.
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THE RECODIFICATION
The Virginia Code Commission, pursuant to Senate Joint Resolu-
tion 41,11 drafted and submitted to the 1975 General Assembly a
recodification and rearrangement of the statutes relating to money
and interest. This recodification and rearrangement was enacted "
and is contained in a new Chapter 7.2 of Title 6.1 of the Virginia
Code. Thus, with the exception of the interest laws applicable to
small loan companies47 and one 1975 enactment this Chapter con-
tains the entire interest laws of Virginia. With one exception it
became law on June 1, 1975. 41
New Chapter 7.2 contains 43 sections divided into ten articles.
The remainder of this article is a section by section analysis of the
new statutes. Although few substantive changes were made in 1975,
where they were made they will be specifically pointed out in the
discussion of the section where the change occurs.
Article I: General
Article I contains three sections which encompass the provisions
of seven previous sections. " Section 611 continues the dollar, cent
and mill as the money of account in Virginia and maintains that no
writing shall be invalid merely because the amount of money is
expressed otherwise than in the money of account of Virginia.
Section 7 provides that in a suit for a sum of money expressed in
45. S.J. Ras. 41, Virginia General Assembly, Regular Session (1974).
46. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 448, at 769, codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.6 et
seq. (Cum. Supp. 1975).
47. See VA. CODE ANN . §§ 6.1-244 to -310 (Repl. Vol. 1973) (interest laws applicable to
small loan companies); id. § 6.1-5.2 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (allows the State Corporation Com-
mission to confer upon state banks the power to charge 1% above the discount rate charged
banks by the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond on 90-day commercial paper). Previously
Title 6.1 contained a general Chapter 7 relating to money and interest, a Chapter 7.1 relating
to unlicensed and unsupervised lenders and various other sections, particularly the statutes
relating to savings and loan associations.
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.26 (Cum. Supp. 1975) relating to late charges applies only to
transactions arising after July 1, 1975. This resulted not from any particular legislative intent,
but from the failure of the draftsmen to focus upon the fact that in odd years legislative acts
take effect on June 1 rather than July 1.
49. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-311 to -317 (Repl. Vol. 1973), repealed by Va. Acts of
Assembly 1975, ch. 448, at 769.
50. For purposes of clarity and differentiation, the new sections will be referred to only by
the number after the last decimal. For example, in the text § 6.1-330.6 will be referred to as
section 6. The more complex statutes will be set out in the notes.
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foreign currency or otherwise than in the dollar, cent and mill, the
trier of fact is required to ascertain the value in dollars, cents and
mills, making such an allowance for the difference of exchange as
shall be just. The question whether the exchange value should be
computed as of the date of the contract, the date of supposed per-
formance, the date of the trial, or some other date is left
unanswered, due to the complex fluctuation of exchange rates and
a lack of strong feeling as to which time would be more appropriate.
Section 8 prohibits the issuance by any association or company
of any note, bill, scrip or other paper or thing intended to be circu-
lated as currency unless authorized by law. 1 This section also pro-
vides that any contract or security originating from any illegal cur-
rency dealings is void.
Article II: Interest Rates Generally and on Judgments
This Article sets forth three fundamental interest rates, the legal
rate, the judgment rate, and the contract rate. Section 9 fixes the
legal rate at 6% per annum. The legal rate is not the rate that
judgments bear, nor is it the highest lawful rate of general applica-
tion. Basically, it is the rate which is implied by law where the
obligation calls for the payment of interest, but no rate is fixed.
However, if a negotiable instrument under Article 3 of the Uniform
Commercial Code calls for the payment of interest without specify-
ing a rate, the rate is deemed to be the judgment rate.2 Section 10
fixes the judgment rate at 8% per annum. A conforming amendment
makes the general judgment rate applicable to judgments in favor
of small loan companies.13
Except as otherwise provided, the maximum rate of interest at
which parties may contract is fixed in section 11 at 8% per annum. 4
51. The prohibition of section 8 stands "unless authorized by law." See VA. CODE ANN. §§
6.1-370 to -379 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (regulation of the sale and issuance of money orders).
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3-118(d) (Add. Vol. 1965).
53. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 270, at 465-66, codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-273
(Cum. Supp. 1975). Formerly, the judgment rate applicable to small loan companies was 6%
per annum.
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.11 (Cum. Supp. 1975):
Except as otherwise permitted by law, no contract shall be made, for the loan or
forbearance of money at a greater rate of interest than eight per centum per annum,
including points expressed as a percentage of the loan divided by the number of years
[Vol. 10:77
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The second paragraph of this section specifies the articles contain-
ing the numerous exceptions to the 8% maximum contract rate.
Although this paragraph might more properly belong in a footnote,
it was intentionally made a part of the section by the Commission
on the premise that statutes are more widely read than footnotes.
The provisions of section 11 continue the requirement that"points" must be included in the computation of the 8% maximum
contract rate. This is true without regard to who pays the "points,"
so long as they are received by the lender, and not otherwise ex-
pressly permitted by statute, as in the case of the 1% processing fee
on real estate loans permitted under sections 22 and 23. 51 The statu-
tory conversion of points to interest differs from the truth-in-lending
concept of annual percentage rate.56 Under section 11, points are
converted to a percentage rate by dividing the points by the number
of years of the loan contract. This is true even though the principal
balance is declining throughout the term of the loan. For example,
if 10 points are paid on a five-year contract, this would be equal,
under section 11, to 2%. Conversion of points to an actuarial annual
percentage rate under truth-in-lending would result in a higher rate
in view of the declining balance of the loan contract.
Article III: Add-on Interest
Article DI contains six sections involving add-on interest. Section
12 defines "charge in advance" in the context of installment loans
as meaning that interest may be added to the principal amount of
the note but may not be deducted from it. It is now applicable to
of the loan contract. For the purpose of this section the term "points" is defined as
the amount of money, or other consideration received by the lender, from whatever
source, as a consideration for making the loan and not otherwise expressly permitted
by statute.
For contracts which may be at a greater interest than eight per centum per annum,
reference is hereby made to article 3... relating to add-on rates, article 4.. . relating
to revolving and monthly rates, article 5.. . relating to other charges on real estate
loans, article 8... relating to transactions not subject to usury or subject to special
limitations to usury, and to article 9... enumerating borrowers not entitled to plead
usury. Further reference is hereby made to chapter 6, §§ 6.1-244 to 6.1-310 relating to
powers of small loan companies.
55. See text accompanying notes 78-80 infra.
56. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1606 (1974).
57. The definition was taken from VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-234 -330 (Repl. Vol. 1973), re-
pealed by Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 448, at 769, dealing with industrial loan associations
and unlicensed lenders respectively.
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all add-on lenders. If a 7% add-on loan is made for a period of one
year and the amount advanced is $1,000.00, the face amount of the
note would be $1,070.00. It is clearly impermissible under this new
definition to make the note for $1,000.00 and advance $930.00, a
practice referred to as discount installment lending. In a one-year
installment loan transaction, the difference between "add-on" and
"discount" may be relatively minor but as the term of the loan
increases to three or four years, the interest variation occasioned
thereby will be much greater. A discount installment rate might in
some instances still be used in connection with a time-price transac-
tion, or with a person who is not permitted to plead usury." The
definition of "charge in advance" would seem to be binding upon
national banks, notwithstanding the privilege of discount under 12
U.S.C. § 85.11 For example, in First National Bank v. Nawlin ° the
Eighth Circuit held that a national bank may not under 12 U.S.C.
§ 85 discount installment loan notes if such practice violates state
law. The court continued to recognize the established rule that
national banks may discount short term single payment notes
notwithstanding state law. A dictum in the opinion appears to indi-
cate that short term single payment paper is paper that matures in
one year or less.
Section 13 permits a bank to charge a 7% add-on rate. The lan-
guage in the prior statute" permitting acceleration of an add-on
note has been deleted from section 13 as superfluous, but accelera-
tion is still permitted under general law and specifically sanctioned
58. The "time-price" doctrine has been described thus:
The recognized rule is that a sale of an article on credit at a price higher than for cash
is not usurious if it is a bona fide sale of that character, which is known to the buyer,
and is not a subterfuge for charging a higher interest rate. This is so even though the
difference between the two prices would make the total amount paid exceed the
amount of the interest that could lawfully be charged on the cash price. Lundstrom v.
Radio Corp. of America, 17 Utah 2d 144, 405 P.2d 339, 342 (1965).
See note 76 infra. The time-price doctrine has been abrogated with regard to transactions
involving consumer goods by section 21. See text accompanying notes 76-77 infra. Therefore,
a discount installment rate in a time-price transaction involving real estate or personal
property other than consumer goods may be acceptable or in a consumer goods transaction
if its charge does not exceed the amount permitted by section 21.
59. See note 16 supra.
60. 509 F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1975).
61. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-320 (Repl. Vol. 1973), repealed by Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch.
448, at 769.
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under section 35 of the new law. 2 A note may be subject to accelera-
tion for many other reasons not affecting negotiability." The per-
missible 2% investigation fee is continued in section 13, but is now
designated as a "service charge." The 2% service charge permitted
savings and loan associations under previous law4 is now stated in
section 14, which allows a savings and loan association to charge the
7% add-on rate on certain home improvement related and mobile
home loans and in addition to impose a 2% service charge on the
loan amount.
Industrial loan associations are permitted to charge an add-on
rate under section 15 and a 1975 substantive amendment increased
the add-on rate from 7% to 8%. Industrial loan associations may also
impose the 2% service charge. In view of the consistent judicial
construction of 12 U.S.C. § 85, it would appear that national banks
may charge 8% add-on. 5
The add-on privilege allowed to unlicensed and unsupervised
lenders secured by subordinate mortgages on one to four-family
residential property is contained at section 16. A 1975 substantive
amendment increased the add-on rate to 8% per annum plus a 2%
service charge. However, pursuant to sections 25 and 48,66 the 8%
add-on rate on subordinate mortgages does not apply to lenders
licensed by and under the supervision of the State Corporation
Commission or the federal government or to state and national
banks, state and federal savings and loan associations, and state
and federal credit unions. Notwithstanding the negation of national
banks under section 25, it would seem that under 12 U.S.C. § 85 and
its liberal judicial interpretation, national banks may charge the 8%
add-on rate under section 16, as well as section 15. Under section
16, a subordinate mortgage would be a condition precedent for the
national bank, but this would not be true under section 15. A na-
tional bank could charge 12% simple interest on a loan secured by
62. See text accompanying notes 90-91 infra.
63. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3-105 (Add. Vol. 1965) (factors not rendering an instrument
unconditional). See also text accompanying notes 90-91 infra, relating to permissible acceler-
ation, and enunciating a rule that one cannot accelerate unearned interest.
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-195.34(i) (Repl. Vol. 1973) (amended to delete reference to interest
and service charges).
65. See note 8 supra.
66. See text accompanying notes 83-84 infra.
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a second mortgage on such qualifying residential real estate under
paragraph D of section 16.
Previously, statutory language" provided that the charges per-
mitted to second or subordinate mortgage lenders could not be made
on a new or additional loan until after the passage of eighteen
months. This was amended, in order to clearly state the legislative
intent, by prohibiting the imposition of the 2% service charge upon
money already lent. Section 16 specifically states that to the extent
new money is advanced in addition to the outstanding principal
balance at the time of the advance, the 2% service charge may be
imposed only upon the new advance. Without this change, the stat-
ute seemed to work a very peculiar result in that, if the borrower
wanted to secure additional financing on the same residence or to
secure additional financing on another residence, he could not go to
the same lender. Section 16 also makes clear that on subordinate
mortgage loans, rates otherwise permitted under any other section
or otherwise permitted by law may be utilized.
The language relating to acceleration was left in section 16. This
language requires a default for a period of 30 days prior to accelera-
tion on a loan secured by a subordinate mortgage. Section 35 con-
tains no 30-day default provision. However, a lender should not be
able to collect unearned interest on accelerated section 16 loans in
accordance with the prohibition of such collection under section35 .68
A new paragraph D in section 16 permits a 12% per annum simple
interest rate on a loan secured by a subordinate mortgage. This
would have its primary application to a single maturity second
mortgage loan to an individual which is not for a business purpose
or if for a business purpose, is in an initial amount of less than
$5,000.00. The 2% service charge permitted in paragraph A, in addi-
tion to 8% add-on, is not found in paragraph D.
Section 17 deals with the quotation of installment loan rates for
consumer credit purposes. In a consumer transaction, as defined for
federal truth-in-lending purposes, 9 the lender may not quote solely
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330 (Repl. Vol. 1973), repealed by Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch.
448, at 769.
68. See text accompanying notes 90-91 infra.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (1970).
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in terms of an add-on discount installment rate, but must quote an
annual percentage rate. Use of the annual rate computed pursuant
to the Federal Truth-in-Lending Act" is compliance with this stat-
ute. An interpretation by the Federal Reserve, issued pursuant to
the advertising provisions of the Act,7' states that in a consumer
transaction, the loan should be quoted only in terms of annual per-
centage rate and that an add-on rate should not be used. For this
reason, the lender should encourage.its employees to speak only in
terms of annual percentage rates when discussing loans with pro-
spective borrowers. Nevertheless, because a violation of section 17
imposes a civil penalty upon a lender72 and the advertising provi-
sions of the Federal Truth-In-Lending Act 73 do not impose a civil
penalty, the prefatory language of "not solely in terms of an add-on
or discount installment rate" was retained to cover the situation
where an employee might inadvertently say "at a 6% add-on rate
which is the equivalent of 11%." It is submitted that in such case,
there has been a full disclosure and the lender should not be penal-
ized for such quotation.
A new paragraph B in section 17 codifies an opinion of the Attor-
ney General74 that a note or other evidence of indebtedness which
provides for an add-on or discount rate may state in such note or
other evidence of indebtedness the annual percentage rate quoted
in accordance with the federal truth-in-lending statutes. This seems
an obvious conclusion because the federal statutes indicate that
such disclosure might be made in the note itself. The general prac-
tice with regard to installment notes is to state both the total
amount of the obligation and the amount of each installment, with-
out any breakdown of principal and interest or statement of the
annual percentage rate or the add-on or discount rate. The new
subsection seems to make abundantly clear that which should al-
ready be clear, i.e., disclosing or quoting the annual percentage rate
in an add-on installment note as required by federal law does not
render the note usurious.
70. Id. § 1606.
71. FRB Letter of March 29, 1971, No. 465, CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 30,663.
72. The penalty is twice the amount of the finance charges, but in no event less than
$100.00 or more than $1,000.00.
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1661-65 (1970).
74. Op. A7r'y GEN. (October 7, 1974).
1975]
UNIVL'RSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Article IV: Revolving and Monthly Rates
This article attempts to gather in one place the various rates
allowable on a monthly basis. In a consumer credit transaction,
under federal truth-in-lending, the annual percentage rate must
still be quoted.
Section 18 permits a credit union to make loans at a rate of
interest not exceeding 1% per month computed on unpaid balances.
A borrower from a credit union is permitted by section 28 to prepay
his loan in whole or in part at any time without penalty. It is sub-
mitted that the proper interpretation of section 18 is that a credit
union may make a loan either at the rate of 1% per month or as
otherwise permitted by law."5
A bank is permitted by section 19 to charge 1% per month on daily
balances or on maximum calendar or fiscal monthly balances on
written contracts for revolving credit. Additionally, a bank may
charge a service fee of $.25 for each check, draft or other order. A
2% service charge on the amount of the loan is also permitted. The
primary utilization of this section has been in connection with over-
draft banking or check credit plans, and in connection with cash
advances under credit cards, where some banks have, in addition,
imposed a 2% initial service charge on each advance.
Section 20 sets forth a permissible 11/2% per month or 18% per
annum service charge on open-end credit or similar plans under
which a service charge may be imposed if the unpaid balance is not
paid in full within a period of twenty-five days from the billing date.
It is required that the 11/2% per month charge be imposed on the
average daily balance or on the balance existing on the billing date
(or end of the fiscal billing period) or on a balance which does not
result in a greater charge than computable under the former two
methods. Unlike section 20, section 19 does not require an average
daily balance computation in order to charge its 1% per month rate.
The 11/2 % per month charge allowed by section 20 is conditioned
upon the seller or lender mailing the statement not later than eight
days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays) after the billing
date. A clarifying amendment changed the words "less than" to
75. For example, if the loan is made to a person not permitted to plead usury under section
43. See text accompanying note 98 infra.
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"later than" in the eight-day rule. An over-technical reading of "less
than" could have led one to conclude that if a creditor mailed the
statement before the expiration of eight days after the billing date,
it could not impose a service charge, but it would be able to impose
a service charge if the statement were mailed on or after the eight-
day period-a conclusion which would have been clearly at odds
with the intent of the statute.
Section 21 continues the limitation on the time-price doctrine" as
applicable to sales or leases of consumer goods as defined in the
Uniform Commercial Code. The permissible service charge for sales
of consumer goods remains as "not exceeding 2% per month." A
1975 amendment makes it clear that a deferral or extension of time
for payment may be made subject to the 2% per month service
charge. Another change specifies the balance on which the service
charge may be imposed, i.e. the balance at the end of the billing
period next preceding each successive payment, and provides that
such balance may include the deferred portion of the sales price of
consumer goods, and the costs and charges incidental to the trans-
action, including insurance premiums financed in connection
therewith. In the case of an automobile purchase, this ought to cover
titling costs.
On precomputed transactions, the debtor has the right under sec-
tion 21 to prepay and receive a rebate determined in accordance
with the Rule of 7W's (sum of the digits)7" or any other method
76. Since 1873, it has been settled in Virginia that usury does not attach to bona fide sale
transactions. The time-price doctrine holds that a seller of property may exact a higher time
price than cash price, and that the time price differential "is not considered interest in the
strict sense and may exceed an amount which, if considered interest, would be usurious."
General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Lunsford, 209 Va. 743, 748, 167 S.E.2d 414, 418 (1969). See
Kidd v. Brothers, 212 Va. 197, 183 S.E.2d 140 (1971); Graeme v. Adams, 64 Va. (23 Gratt.)
225 (1873).
77. The Rule of 78's is defined at VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.32 (Cum. Supp. 1975):
A. The Rule of 78 is so named because the months of one year, i.e. one through
twelve added together, total seventy-eight.
B. To determine the amount of the rebate of unearned interest under the Rule of
78 on a loan where payment is anticipated:
1. Determine the number of months over which the loan is to be repaid according
to its terms. Write the numbers in sequence and add (for example, for a four-year loan
write the numbers one through forty-eight). The total will be the denominator of a
fraction to be determined below.
2. Determine the number of months remaining on the loan after payment is antici-
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selected by the seller provided the service charge imposed for the
time the debt is actually outstanding does not exceed 2% per month.
In any event a seller is permitted to condition rebates upon earning
a minimum of $25.00 in service charges. This provision is designed
to cover minimum acquisition charges. Late charges permitted
under section 26 may be imposed without regard to the 2% per
month otherwise permitted.
Premiums for credit life insurance and credit accident and health
insurance purchased by the debtor are not within the 2% per month
limitation if the insurance coverage is purchased voluntarily by the
debtor. In the case of property insurance, the purchaser may be
required to have such insurance (as in the case of a car loan), but
the insurance premium is not within the 2% per month limitation,
unless the seller requires the purchase of such insurance from or
through the seller.
While the primary thrust of section 21 is upon merchants and
sellers of consumer goods, it nevertheless has application to lenders
who purchase such paper from merchants and sellers. If the transac-
tion is lawful in the first instance, it should be valid notwithstand-
ing the fact that a later sale of the obligation to a third party at a
discount causes the service charge to exceed 2% per month. Con-
versely, if the initial transaction between the seller and the buyer
violates the statute, a subsequent sale of the obligation arising from
such transaction to a third party would not validate the obligation.
An assignee of the seller must ascertain at its peril the fact that the
transaction initially complied with section 21, although the assignee
should be entitled to the benefit of its good faith if a negotiable
instrument is involved.
Article V: Other Charges on Real Estate Loans
Section 22 permits a bank or other lender to charge and collect
pated. Write in inverse sequence and add (for example, for a four-year loan anticipated
after the third month, write the numbers forty-five back to one). The total will be the
numerator of the fraction of which subparagraph 1 above is the denominator.
3. Multiply the original amount of interest that would have been paid over the life
of the loan by the fraction derived as above, such figure, so determined, is the amount
to be rebated.
Payment anticipated between scheduled payment dates shall not be considered but
instead the succeeding scheduled payment date shall be used in the above determina-
tion, notwithstanding any contrary provision of law.
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service charges not to exceed 21/2% of the amount of a loan for
construction on or improvement of real estate. In lieu of the 21/2%
charge, the bank or lender may require the borrower to pay the
actual cost and expenses of supervising and inspecting the construc-
tion or improvement. The statute further permits the imposition of
a service charge of 1% on real estate mortgage loans generally, but
if the bank or other lender makes both the construction loan and the
permanent loan, its total fees may not exceed 2 2 %. Finally, section
22 permits the bank or other lender to recover the reasonable and
necessary charges of third persons or other out-of-pocket expenses.,
The permissible! service charges for savings and loan associations
on real estate loans are set out at section 23. Non-application of
section 22 to savings and loan associations and the existence of
section 23 are best explained by the fact that section 23 generally
parallels federal regulations79 relating to federal savings and loan
associations. It contains generally the same criteria and permissible
charges as section 22 with the following differences:
(a) It permits a 22% service charge on construction loans or a
minimum fee of $50.00, whichever is greater.
(b) On other loans secured by real estate, it permits a minimum
charge of $20.00 or 1% of the principal amount, whichever is
greater. (The minimum dollar provisions appear to have their appli-
cation to construction loans and other real estate loans of less than
$2,000.00-a relative rarity in these times.)
(c) The express language contained in section 22 prohibiting the
same bank or lender from making 21/2% on the construction loan and
1% on the permanent loan is not contained in section 23. The same
concept, however, may be implicit in section 23 by the phrase "on
all other loans secured by real estate.""
78. Examples of such "reasonable and necessary charges" enumerated by the statute are:
recording fees, title insurance, attorney's fees, insurance, appraisals, credit reports and
surveys.
79. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1464-66 (1969).
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.23 (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides:
To cover the costs of investigating and processing the loan, a savings and loan associa-
tion may charge and collect in advance from the borrower a service charge not to
exceed fifty dollars or two and one-half per centum of the principal amount of the loan,
whichever is the greater, on construction loans, and, on all other loans secured by real
estate a service charge not to exceed twenty dollars or one per centum of the principal
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(d) Savings and loan associations are permitted to recover "rea-
sonable and necessary charges" under section 23 as opposed to "out-
of-pocket expenses" permitted other lenders under section 22. The
primary difference would seem to relate to "appraisals." A bank or
other lender should be able to pass along the cost of such an ap-
praisal under section 22 only if the appraisal fee was payable to a
third person (which might include a bank employee or bank direc-
tor). A savings and loan association apparently can collect and re-
tain an appraisal fee under section 23.
Section 24 relates to other charges on real estate loans secured by
a subordinate mortgage and made by an unlicensed and unsuper-
vised lender. Section 25 makes section 24 inapplicable to licensed
and supervised lenders. The statute allows the lender to pass along
the "actual cost" of title examination, title insurance, recording
fees, surveys, attorney's fees and appraisal fees. This differs from
section 22 which requires such cost to be "out-of-pocket expenses"
and from section 23 which permits collection of certain "reasonable
and necessary charges."
The actual cost of "credit reports" is not an enumerated permissi-
ble charge under section 24. Fire and extended coverage insurance
and decreasing term life insurance are permitted, but mortgage
guaranty insurance which is permitted under both sections 22 and
23 is not enumerated in section 24. Presumably credit reports and
mortgage guaranty insurance might be paid by the lender and
recovered from the borrower within the 8% add-on plus 2% service
charge permitted under section 16.51 Accident and health insurance
may be provided by the lender at the borrower's option and the
premium therefor is not considered a finance charge.
With regard to unenumerated charges, section 24 expressly pro-
hibits other charges including certain fees and brokerage fees. Nei-
amount of the loan, whichever is greater, unless the laws of this State shall otherwise
provide for a higher amount, in which case the latter shall be applicable. An associa-
tion also may require the borrower to pay the reasonable and necessary charges in
connection with making the loan, including the cost of title examination, title insur-
ance, recording and filing fees, taxes, insurance, including mortgage guaranty insur-
ance, appraisals, credit reports, surveys, drawing of papers and closing the loan.
Such fees and charges shall not be considered in determining whether a contract for
a loan or forbearance of money or other things is illegal within the meaning of this title.
81. See text accompanying notes 62-68 supra.
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ther sections 22 nor 23 contain any specific limitation on other fees.
Section 24 expressly permits a broker's or finder's fee which is paid
by the lender from the service charge or interest allowed to the
lender under section 16, or is paid by the borrower if the total inter-
est, service charge, and such broker's or finder's fee does not exceed
the 8% add-on plus the 2% service charge. Broker's fees, except
those in connection with loans by unlicensed and unsupervised
lenders and which are secured by subordinate mortgages, should
still be permitted in addition to interest under the rule enunciated
in Chakales v. Djiovanides.2
Section 25 states that sections 24, 16 and 31 do not apply to loans
made by certain licensed and supervised lenders. However, section
24 still applies to loans by banks, savings and loan associations and
credit unions formed under the laws of another state. An FDIC
insured bank organized under the laws of a state other than Virginia
might be said to be "supervised" by the federal government, but
admission to the status of insurance of deposits does not seem to be
within the term "licensed." A subsidiary of a bank holding company
is probably "supervised" but not "licensed." Approval of the Fed-
eral Reserve Board prior to acquisition by a holding company does
not seem to be a "license" within this statute. A subsidiary of a state
or national bank presents a more puzzling problem. Approval of the
State Corporation Commission is not required for acquisition or
conduct of business through a subsidiary. s3 A limitation on amount
of investment without Commission approval is not the equivalent
of "licensing." It is hard to theorize that the bank subsidiary suc-
ceeds to the bank's status under section 25 or section 48.4
The application of sections 25 and 48 to insurance companies,
both domestic and foreign, who are licensed by and under the super-
vision of the State Corporation Commission would seem to be clear,
but perhaps academic in this type of loan.
82. 161 Va. 48, 170 S.E. 848 (1933). The court stated:
The majority of the cases which have passed upon the question hold that where the
lender has to borrow the money loaned, he may, without being guilty of usury, contract
with the borrower to make good to him the reasonable expenses actually incurred by
him in good faith in procuring the money to be loaned, including any brokerage or
commissions he may have to pay to get it. Id. at 86, 170 S.E. at 861.
83. See VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-58.1 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
84. See text accompanying note 103 infra.
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Article VI: Late Charges
Prior to 1975, Virginia had three sections relating to late charges.85
Section 26 combines these former sections and provides that in the
case of an installment or single maturity debt, any lender or seller
may impose a late charge not to exceed 5% of the amount of such
installment payment." Late charges in excess of 5% are invalid to
the extent they exceed 5%, but the obligation is not otherwise af-
fected. The charge must be specified in the contract between the
lender or seller and the debtor. "Timely" payment was not defined
by prior statutes, but is defined here as a payment made by the date
fixed for payment or within a period of seven calendar days after
such due date.
If the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, the Veterans
Administration, or any other federal agency or organization should
adopt any rules or regulations dealing with the application of late
penalties to loans insured or guaranteed by such federal agency,
then those rules and regulations control.
Article VII: Prepayment and Acceleration Laws
Technically, prepayment charges are not charges for use of
money, but are charges for the privilege of avoiding a contract to pay
interest. Regulation of prepayment penalties is generally found in
the interest statutes and it was decided to place the sections relating
to early payment, whether by prepayment or acceleration, in one
article. Section 28 permits a borrower from a credit union to prepay
in whole or in part at any time without any penalty.
Section 27 permits a maximum one percent prepayment penalty
on first deed of trust loans of less than $75,000 and provides that
any prepayment penalty in excess of 1% is unenforceable as to the
85. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-324 (Repl. Vol. 1973), repealed by Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch.
448, at 769, permitted reasonable late charges in the case of real estate loans. Id. § 6.1-195.17
(Repl. Vol. 1973), repealed by Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 448, at 769, permitted the same
for real estate loans by savings and loan associations. The statute of most general application
appeared to be id. § 6.1-2.2, Va. Acts of Assembly 1973, ch. 111, at 156, repealed by Va. Acts
of Assembly 1975, ch. 448, at 769, which provided a maximum late penalty of 5% of the
amount of the payment in the case of an installment debt.
86. Late charges do not include charges imposed because of acceleration of the entire debt
or costs of collection and attorney's fees. The limitations apply to debts created after July 1,
1975.
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excess. The one percent penalty must be applied against the unpaid
principal balance. The primary application of this statute is to com-
mercial loans, in view of section 29, which provides a different rule
for prepayment penalties in connection with owner occupied resi-
dences. Under section 27, can a borrower insist on being permitted
to make a partial prepayment, and if so what penalty can the lender
charge? Suppose the unpaid principal balance is $60,000.00 and the
borrower desires to prepay $10,000.00. This section could be inter-
preted to permit assessment of the maximum penalty of $600.00.
But suppose a second partial prepayment is made? Can the lender
now assess another penalty? It is submitted that the prudent and
safe construction of the statute is that the prepayment penalty may
not ever exceed 1% of the principal balance at the time of the first
prepayment, and that in the case of a partial prepayment, a lender
should not attempt to assert the maximum prepayment penalty rate
to the outstanding principal balance at the time of each partial
prepayment. Section 27 does not apply if another statute (sections
28 through 34) or federal regulation relating to prepayment is
applicable. For example, federal savings and loan associations
are governed by federal regulation.
A prepayment penalty of 2% on loans secured by owner occupied
residences is provided by section 29. A substantive amendment
made the statute applicable only to loans secured by "a home which
is occupied or to be occupied in whole or in part by the borrower,"
and a committee amendment made the 2% permissible prepayment
penalty applicable to any lender. The penalty is not now limited to
first deeds of trust. The statute does not specify, as does section
27, the effect of a violation, but merely states that the penalty shall
not exceed 2%. Unlike section 27, this section applies to loans in
excess of $75,000.00. Thus, under sections 27 and 29 the following
prepayment penalties are permissible in real estate loans covered
thereby:
(1) Home loans without regard to amount and where the home
is occupied by the borrower-2%.
(2) Other loans under $75,000.00-1%.
(3) Other loans of $75,000.00 or more-as agreed by the parties.
Under section 30 natural persons borrowing from industrial loan
associations may prepay at any time without penalty. On loans
where the interest has been added to the face amount of the note,
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the borrower is entitled to credit for unearned interest computed in
accordance with the Rule of 78's. The credit or rebate is subject to
an anticipation premium equal to the contract interest allowable
under the Rule of 78's for the next six payments. If the borrower is
a natural person and the interest has not been added to the face
amount of the note, it would seem that no premium is permissible.
A corporation or partnership borrowing from an industrial loan asso-
ciation ought to be within the 1% prepayment provision of section
27 if the initial amount of the loan is less than $75,000.00 and if the
loan is secured by a first deed of trust.
Section 31 permits the borrower under a loan secured by a subor-
dinate mortgage and made by a lender not licensed or supervised
by the State Corporation Commission to prepay at any time, and,
in the case of an add-on loan, to receive a rebate of unearned interest
based on the Rule of 78's.
The Rule of 78's, which is the statutory method for rebate under
section 30 (industrial loan associations), section 31 (unlicensed and
unsupervised lenders) and section 21 (certain time-price transac-
tions) is codified at section 32. In Beneficial Discount v. Johnson,7
the Virginia Supreme Court held that identification of the method
of rebate as opposed to an explanation of the method of rebate
complied with the requirements of disclosure under Regulation Z. 8
Section 33 provides that no prepayment penalty on a loan secured
by not more than four family residential units may be collected if
prepayment results from enforcement of the lender's right to call the
loan upon sale of the real property securing the loan. A 1975 amend-
ment expressly provides that if the loan is prepaid because of a sale
to a person whom the lender has rejected or has failed to approve
within fifteen days after written request for approval, the prepay-
ment is presumed to result from enforcement of the right to call the
loan. However, if a borrower requests the lender to approve assump-
tion of a deed of trust by prospective purchaser A, and A is rejected
or not approved within fifteen days and the property is then sold to
B, the prepayment penalty may still be assessed. The statute does
87. 215 Va. 582, 211 S.E.2d 571 (1975).
88. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(7) (1975).
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not expressly permit the lender to require any financial information
in connection with a written request for approval of a new grantee
as substitute borrower, but such a request is not prohibited.
If a loan, secured by not more than four family residential dwell-
ing units, is subject to acceleration or renegotiation upon the sale
or conveyance of the property or part thereof, 9 section 34 requires
the mortgage or deed of trust to contain in the body or in the margin
a statement, either in capital letters or underlined, advising the
borrower:
NOTICE. THE DEBT SECURED HEREBY IS SUBJECT TO
CALL IN FULL OR THE TERMS THEREOF BEING MODIFIED
IN THE EVENT OF SALE OR CONVEYANCE OF THE PROP-
ERTY CONVEYED.
The 1975 amendments do not require the deed of trust to contain
the exact statutory language. It is submitted, however, that tracking
the statutory language is the prudent and safe course to follow.
Printing the notice in bold-type does not comply with the statute,
even though this may be more conspicuous than capital letters or
underlining.
Section 35 provides that the note evidencing an installment loan
at an add-on rate may provide that the unpaid balance, at the
option of the holder, may become due and payable upon default in
the payment of any installment. The lender, if it accelerates, is not
entitled to judgment for unearned interest, even though the face
amount of the note may not distinguish between interest and princi-
pal. The accelerated balance is computed as if the borrower had
made a voluntary prepayment on the date of acceleration and re-
ceived a credit for unearned interest based upon the Rule of 78's.
The accelerated balance thereafter bears interest, until judgment,
at the annual percentage rate shown under a truth-in-lending dis-
closure pursuant to federal law.
This section is limited, however, by section 11-4.311 which pro-
vides that in a contract or other evidence of indebtedness arising
from the sale or financing of consumer goods, no acceleration or
repossession is permitted upon default if payment and applicable
89. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-2.5 (Cum. Supp. 1975) which restricts the right of
acceleration on mortgage loans on certain residential property because of a further encum-
brance.
90. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-4.3 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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late charges are paid within ten days of the date on which the
installment was due. Thus, it would appear that in section 11-4.3
transactions the balance may not be accelerated until the 11th day
after default and the balance would be computed as if a voluntary
prepayment were made on the 11th day after default.'
Section 36 confers upon the buyer of consumer goods the right to
refinance certain balloon loan payments. If the seller retains a secu-
rity interest in the consumer goods purchased and any installment
payment, other than the down payment, is more than 10% greater
than the regular installment payment, the buyer may refinance
such payment or payments on the basis of an extended period of
time and additional payments. The refinancing must allow the un-
paid balance to be paid in as few periodic payments not to exceed
10% of the regular scheduled installment payments as are required
to pay the balance. The section is inapplicable where the parties
agree in a separate writing that one or more payments or the inter-
vals between such payments are reduced or expanded in accor-
dance with the desires or needs of the borrower, if the fluctuations
are expressly arranged to coincide with anticipated fluctuation in
the buyer's capability to make such payments. If the seller refuses
to comply with this section, he is not entitled to return or reposses-
sion of the goods involved, or to a judgment for the unpaid balance
at the time of his failure to comply. Technically the statute imposes
the penalty only upon the seller, but it would be prudent for an
assignee of the seller to act as if such assignee were also subject to
the penalties of this statute.
Article VIII: Transactions Not Subject to Usury or Subject to
Special Limitations as to Usury
Section 37 provides that a first deed of trust or first mortgage may
be lawfully enforced at the interest rate stated in the contract.
There has been some imprecision and perhaps indecision as to what
constitutes the contract in which the interest rate must be stated.
The contract for repayment is the note and while most prudent
lenders insert the interest rate in both the note and deed of trust, it
was thought that insertion of the rate in either the note or the deed
91. See VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.16 (Cum. Supp. 1975) relating to certain subordinate
mortgages. See also text accompanying notes 66-68 supra.
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of trust would comply with the statute. A 1975 Senate amendment
added the provision that disclosure of charges, which are not other-
wise specified in the note, deed of trust or mortgage, in an interest
disclosure statement pursuant to federal disclosure laws is sufficient
compliance with section 37.
A leasehold estate of not less than twenty-five years is considered
to be real estate for purposes of section 37. The statute further lays
down rules as to fluctuating rates by providing that if a rate fluc-
tuates in accordance with any exterior standard, such as "2% above
prime" or "2% above passbook savings rate," such rate is not an
"interest rate stated therein" and is not enforceable in excess of the
contract rate of 8%, unless made to a person not entitled to plead
usury.
Another 1975 amendment specifies that if the same lender holds
both a first deed of trust and second deed of trust from the same
grantor or mortgagor, the second deed of trust is treated as a first
deed of trust for purposes of section 37. Thus, the interest rate
limitations on subordinate deeds of trust do not apply here. If a
second mortgagor assumes the obligation under a first mortgage, the
first and second mortgages are considered as being made by the
same mortgagor and if the same lender holds both mortgages, the
second mortgage is treated as a first mortgage. (This is sometimes
referred to as "one plus two equals one.")
Section 38 provides that no person by way of defense or otherwise
may avail himself of the provisions of this Chapter or any other
sections relating to usury to avoid or defeat the payment of any
interest or any fee or any other sum, if the loan is insured by FHA
or guaranteed by VA, or is insured or guaranteed by any similar
federal governmental agency, or is directly or indirectly assisted in
any manner by the Virginia Housing Development Authority. The
broad reference to "the provisions of this Chapter or any other sec-
tion relating to usury" and to "any interest or fee or any other sum"
is prompted by the decision in Tuttle v. Haddock.2
A bank or other lending institution which is licensed or supervised
by the state or federal government is permitted by section 39 to
charge a rate of interest 3% in excess of the rate paid on passbook
92. 213 Va. 63, 189 S.E.2d 363 (1972). See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
19751
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
savings accounts, savings certificates and certificates of deposit se-
curing the loan. The loan must be secured "in full" by the savings
account or certificate in order for the lender to avail itself of this
section. Thus, if a borrower has a $5,000.00 certificate of deposit and
a $3,000.00 savings account and wishes to borrow $7,000.00, the
lender should make two loans, one secured in full by the certificate
of deposit and the other in full by the passbook savings account so
that there is no question about the applicable rate. This section also
provides that a lender may, in connection with a loan secured by a
savings account or other certificate, charge any other rate otherwise
permitted by law, such as an add-on rate. The General Assembly
dropped prior statutory93 language requiring the loan to be secured"solely" by the savings account. This was done because many in-
struments pledging collateral to secure a note also secure any other
indebtedness to the bank, and the requirement of being secured"solely" by a savings certificate was thought to be an unintentional
trap for a lender whose employees might be unaware of the provi-
sions in all the forms in current use.
Section 40 lifted provisions from prior law 4 which permitted
banks and certain brokers to make loans for agricultural purposes,
whether or not secured, at a rate not to exceed the maximum effec-
tive rate permitted installment loans. In lieu of the maximum effec-
tive rate for installment loans, the rate of 12% per annum was in-
serted which is less than the former effective rate. 5 The amendment
removed any question as to whether the reference to "maximum
effective rate" was one for the actual term of the agricultural loan
or for any hypothetical term. If the 12% rate on agricultural loans
is used, the 2% service charge associated with the installment rate
and otherwise permitted under section 13 is not permitted under
section 40. If the loan is for agricultural purposes under section 40
and for an initial amount of $5,000.00 or more, then under section
44 the general usury provisions do not apply. Hence, section 40
93. Va. Acts of Assembly, 1974, ch. 261, at 387, repealed by Va. Acts of Assembly 1975,
ch. 448, at 769.
94. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-319.1 (Repl. Vol. 1973), repealed by Va. Acts of Assembly 1975,
ch. 448, at 769.
95. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-320 (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended by Va. Acts of Assembly 1974,
ch. 290, at 440, repealed by Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 448, at 769, permitted a 7% add-
on rate.
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would seem to have its primary application to loans in the initial
amount of less than $5,000.00. Section 40 allows agricultural credit
corporations to charge on loans for agricultural purposes a rate of
11/2% in excess of the rate charged by a federal intermediate credit
bank to such credit corporations or to charge the 8% contract rate
permitted under section 11.
Banks and certain brokers are permitted to collect interest in
advance at the rate of 8% on the basis of a 360-day year for periods
up to one year by section 41. When the discount rate of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond on 90-day commercial paper is higher
than 7%, a national bank may, under 12 U.S.C. § 85, collect interest
in advance at a rate of 1% above the discount rate, and so may a
state bank if the State Corporation Commission allows it by regula-
tion."
The statute also permits a minimum fee or discount fee of $5.00
which may not be charged on renewals except after the passage of
ninety days. It further permits a service charge not exceeding 2% of
the amount of the loan. But a 1975 amendment expressly provides
that the 2% service charge may not be imposed on a renewal or
extension except after the passage of 360 days from a prior imposi-
tion. If a national bank were to discount a note in excess of 8%
pursuant to the provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 85, the 2% service charge
under this section would not be permitted because the service
charge is in addition to the 8% otherwise permitted under section
41, not what is permitted under 12 U.S.C. § 85.11 In addition to the
2% service charge in this section, banks may charge it on add-on
loans under section 13 and also on revolving credit loans under
section 19.
96. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-5.2 (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides:
In addition to the permissible interest rates and charges specifically granted to banks
and to lenders generally by this title, the State Corporation Commission may by order,
from time to time, confer upon State banks the power to take, receive, reserve, and
charge on any loan or discount made, at a rate of one per centum in excess of the
discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the Federal Reserve Bank
for the fifth Federal Reserve District, it being intended the State Corporation Commis-
sion may thereby confer upon State banks the power to make comparable charges
permitted under any federal statute or regulation to any national banking association.
97. Under 12 U.S.C. § 85, a national bank may collect interest in advance without regard
to state law at the maximum rate permitted by state law or at 1% above the discount rate
permitted by state law or at 1% above the discount rate on 90-day paper charged by the
Federal Reserve Bank in the region of the national bank. See note 16 supra.
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A broker-dealer licensed by the State Corporation Commission
and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission is
permitted under section 42 to charge a customer to whom it extends
credit on pledged securities an amount not to exceed a monthly
charge at the rate of 11 % per annum above the rate charged the
broker-dealer by a bank doing business in Virginia. The rate
charged by the bank to the broker must be on loans collateralized
by securities. Before the 1975 amendment, the statute referred to
the rate charged by banks to broker-dealers on such loans, and
seemed to imply a uniform statewide rate from bank to bank and
from locality to locality. It would appear that the broker-dealer
must actually have an existing loan (as opposed to a "line of credit")
in order to come within the scope of this section. It is not required
that the loan from the bank to the broker equal the amount of loans
by such broker-dealer to its customers. If the broker-dealer has loans
from two banks collateralized by similar securities, and the rates of
the banks differ, the broker ought to be allowed to tie its rate to the
higher rate charged to it.
Article IX: Borrowers Not Entitled to Plead Usury
Article IX specifies the persons who cannot avoid paying inter-
est they have contracted to pay. Section 43 denies the defense of
usury to corporations, partnerships, professional associations, real
estate investment trusts and certain joint venturers organized for
holding, developing and managing real estate. Partnerships which
are required to file a certificate as well as foreign partnerships are
also denied this defense. Before, if one loaned money to a foreign
partnership, that partnership could argue it was not required to file
a partnership name certificate or a limited partnership certificate
and therefore could possibly assert a plea of usury. The prohibition
against pleading usury or avoiding interest or any other sum relates
to any provision of Chapter 7.2, or any other section relating to
usury. This eliminates the construction problem posed by Tuttle v.
Haddock .
98. 213 Va. 63, 189 S.E.2d 363 (1972). See note 34 supra. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-2.1 (h)
(Cum. Supp. 1975) permits a corporation to borrow money and pay such rates as the corpora-
tion agrees upon. A similar statute was construed as having usury connotations in Waterman
v. Howard Paper Co., 124 Ga. App. 511, 184 S.E.2d 226 (1971). The court in Tuttle rejected
a similar contention apparently feeling that the predecessor of section 43 was the only statute
applicable in Virginia to bar the plea of usury by a corporation.
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Section 4499 denies the plea of usury on business or investment
loans in the amount of $5,000.00 or more. Business or investment
purposes is defined as the converse of the truth-in-lending definition
of family, household or personal purposes, with the one modification
that farm loans are considered business loans rather than consumer
loans. The statute provides that if the borrower represents in his
own handwriting the purpose of the loan, this representation is con-
clusively binding upon him. This does not require a handwritten
representation as a prerequisite to invoking the business or invest-
ment exception, but merely provides a reasonable method by which
a lender can resolve any doubt as to the borrower's intention.
Article X: Usury-Penalty
Generally, articles one through nine set forth what lenders may
charge and exact from borrowers. Article X, on the other hand, sets
forth the penalties to be assessed against a lender who overcharges.
Beware! Section 45 provides for the forfeiture of future interest.
When the defendant is successful with his plea, judgment can be for
the principal amount only.
In the case of usury already paid, section 46 holds the lender
responsible to the borrower for twice the total interest paid within
the previous two years. If the note is sold, it seems clear that the
statute would cover only the interest paid to or received by the
noteholder who actually took or received the usurious interest, and
not to the succeeding holders of the note. The statute requires that
the suit be brought within two years from the time "the usurious
transaction occurred." Baker v. Lynchburg National Bank, ' inter-
preting the federal usury penalty statute which is similar to the
Virginia statute, holds that each payment of excessive interest is a
usurious transaction, upon which a suit may be brought within two
years from the time of each such payment.
Section 47 provides a null and void penalty applicable to usury
violations by unlicensed and unsupervised mortgage lenders on
loans secured by subordinate mortgages on residential property
composed of one to four family units. A waiver by the borrower of
99. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
100. 120 Va. 208, 91 S.E. 157 (1917).
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the benefit of this chapter or a release of any rights under this
chapter is deemed to be against public policy. It should be noted,
however, that a borrower may in some cases be estopped to set up
the defense of usury. 101
In the case of a person acquiring notes from such an unlicensed
and unsupervised lender, section 47 provides that the null and void
penalty does not apply to any contract or note which has been
assigned to a person who is not the agent or principal of the lender,
and has taken the obligation in good faith and in reasonable reliance
upon the provisions of section 44 relating to business loans in the
initial amount of $5,000.00 or more. If the assignee invokes the good
faith provisions of this statute, it is submitted that he would need
to show that he inquired into the business purpose involved. Nor-
mally a note which is null and void in the hands of a holder is also
null and void in the hands of a holder in due course. Thus, if a
subsequent holder is to avoid the null and void penalty he must be
sure he falls well within the exception provided in this section.'02
Section 48 states the non-applicability of section 47 to loans made
by lenders licensed and supervised by the State Corporation Com-
mission or federal government or by state and national banks, state
and federal savings and loan associations, and state and federal
credit unions. As a practical matter, national banks are subject only
to the federal penalty for usury.'0 3 Hence, the state penalty for usury
is not applicable to national banks, but it is applicable to state
banks organized under state laws other than Virginia. Finally, sec-
tion 48 spells out clearly that section 16 and section 47 do not apply
to a seller in a real estate transaction who takes a subordinate mort-
gage on such real estate.
CONCLUSION
Chapter 7.2 is generally a rearrangement and hopefully a clarifi-
cation of the Virginia laws relating to money and interest. Very few
101. See Heubusch v. Boone, 213 Va. 414, 192 S.E.2d 783 (1973).
102. No opinion is intended as to the status of a loan by a lender subject to section 47 and
sold to a national bank which by both federal and state statute is not subject to the provisions
of section 47 on loans made directly by it. See VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.48 (Cum. Supp. 1975);
12 U.S.C. § 86 (1945).
103. 12 U.S.C. § 86 (1945).
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substantive changes were made; only three basic ones-8% add-on
for industrial loan associations, 4 8% add-on 15 and 12% simple in-
terest'01 for unlicensed and unsupervised lenders on subordinate
mortgages. Hopefully, judges and lawyers, as well as lenders and
borrowers, will find the money and interest laws less burdensome to
work with and more understandable.
It is easy to justify one primary standard for interest and usury
laws. They should be clear, explicit and unambiguous. A lack of any
of these elements will increase the lender's risk and such increased
risk will lead to either increased interest charges or a lack of avail-
able money in the risk area. A statute which insures the creditor the
prompt and certain repayment of his money works to the advantage
of the consumer. For the lower the risk taken by the creditor, the
less charged for the money lent.
The progress of the interest and usury statutes during the past
fifteen years has led the author to conclude that there is much trdth
in the comment that the well-to-do have learned one thing the poor
man has known for years. There is one thing worse than a high
interest rate, and that is money being unavailable when you need
it. Perhaps this was what Moses was saying many centuries ago.
104. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
105. See text accompanying notes 66-68 supra.
106. Id.
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